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A Theory of the Laws of War
Eric A. Posnert
The laws of war govern the weapons and tactics used by militaries
during times of war. These laws, like other international laws, are not
enforced by a central authority, but have force, if they do, only to the
extent that nations either retaliate against belligerents who violate
them or treat the laws of war as interior constraints. Whether the laws
of war do have such force is a question that has not been answered.
States frequently violate the laws of war, and when they do not, it is
often because the laws have minimal, and controversial, content.I But
states do take trouble because of these laws: They take the trouble to
negotiate the laws of war during interwar conferences, and they take
the trouble to argue during war that their behavior does not violate
the laws of war. Putting aside the issue of how much the laws of war
influence the behavior of states, a question of interest is why the laws
of war have their particular content: why nations have agreed to the
existing rules rather than some alternative set of rules. This question is
the focus of this Essay.
I will argue that the laws of war are best understood as devices
for limiting the efficiency of military technology, understood broadly
to include weapons and tactics that enjoy a high ratio of predatory
impact to cost. The lower the level of military technology, the less
wealth that nations will invest in conflict, and the more they will invest
in production and consumption. However, the influence of the laws of
war, and the ability of nations to agree on restrictive laws of war, are
constrained by many factors, including the asymmetry of national re-
sources and the value of destructive weapons for deterring predation.
The laws have a rationale, but their content and influence are likely to
be limited.
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I. THE LAWS OF WAR: AN OVERVIEW
The laws of war were, prior to the twentieth century, part of cus-
tomary international law. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907
were the first significant, multilateral efforts to establish laws of war
by treaty, and there have been many more such efforts since then. The
laws of war can be divided into general principles and specific prohibi-
tions The necessity principle holds that the amount of suffering
caused by a weapon (in the form of death, serious injuries, and so,
forth) should not be more than necessary to achieve a legitimate mili-
tary aim. The discrimination principle holds that civilians should not
be targeted, and the proportionality principle holds that collateral
damage to them and their property should be limited.
The principles are most easily understood in their application to
specific prohibitions. The necessity principle is illustrated by the dis-
tinction between dumdum bullets, which are proscribed, and explosive
shells, which are permitted. Both cause severe wounds compared to
those caused by ordinary bullets, but the explosive shells also disable
or kill more soldiers. For a given level of suffering, the explosive shell
obtains a larger military objective. To be sure, one might quarrel with
both claims, and argue that dumdum bullets are more effective than
explosives and ordinary bullets when the military objective is to stop
enemy soldiers without destroying nearby structures or civilians, but
the basic idea is clear.
The proportionality principle would likely forbid area bombing of
cities such as that which occurred during World War II, which was in-
tended to kill and demoralize civilians. The recent American strategy
of bombing targets from high altitudes so that pilots are invulnerable
to anti-aircraft fire provides a more controversial example. Some have
argued that the strategy produces too many civilian deaths for a given
military objective, and that the proportionality principle requires
American pilots to risk their lives and fly at lower altitudes in order to
reduce the harm to civilians.'
Also interesting, but not squarely following from the principles, is
a rule against perfidy, which forbids soldiers to wear the uniforms of
enemies, to call a truce in order to lure the enemy into the open where
they will be attacked, to disguise a warship as a hospital ship, and so
forth. Deception during war is not prohibited. One can trick the en-
2 This summary is based on Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of
the New Millennium, in Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, eds, The Law ofArmed Conflict:
Into the Next Millennium 185, 194-212 (Naval War College 1998).
3 See, for example, Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings?
Violations of the Laws of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force 13-16 (June 2000).
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emy into thinking that one's army is at point A rather than point B.
The prohibition extends only to deception that involves the manipula-
tion of international law.
There are many other principles and prohibitions, including a
great many maritime rules of an analogous nature, and more detailed
rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and subsequent interna-
tional court opinions. But those that have been mentioned serve to
convey the general sense of the laws of war.
II. THE HUMANITARIAN VIEW
The conventional explanation for the laws of war is that they
serve humanitarian values, but it is hard to find a detailed defense of
this position. The necessity and discrimination principles are usually
identified with the humanitarian premise, as if they logically followed,
but the relationship between the principles and the core value is am-
biguous. Killing and demoralizing civilians and soldiers, and destroy-
ing civilian transportation and communications networks and other
property, have always been tactics in warfare, often justified by long-
term humanitarian goals-the desire to end a war sooner rather than
later -that cannot be accomplished, it is thought, through limited war.
Area, including nuclear, bombing during World War II is just the most
famous example. Destructive weapons and tactics might also serve
humanitarian values by making war an unattractive option for pursu-
ing political ends. This is the theory of nuclear deterrence during the
Cold War and after.'
The other principles and rules of war have an even weaker rela-
tionship to humanitarian values. The rules against perfidy are said to
reflect "chivalric values."5 The prohibition of highly expensive weap-
4 See Paul Kennedy and George J. Andreopoulos, The Laws of War: Some Concluding Re-
flections, in Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds, The Laws of War 214,217 (cited in note 1)
(discussing arguments that exemplary violence may in some cases be considered humane). See
also Best, Humanity in Warfare at 13 (cited in note 1) (similar). Compare Michael Walzer, Just
and Unjust Wars 130-33 (Basic 1977) (rejecting this argument). Nuclear weapons have not been
subject to specific prohibitions but they potentially run afoul of the proportionality principle, de-
pending on their use. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226,245:
The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in
self-defence in all circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is proportionate
under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the
law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.
5 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am J Intl L 239,242-
243 (2000) (describing the traditional influence that notions of chivalry have had on the devel-
opment of the laws of armed conflict); Greenwood, Law of Weaponry at 190 (cited in note 2)
(suggesting that the prohibition of perfidy serves both humanitarian and chivalric ends).
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ons, a goal of some of the parties to the Hague Conferences, appears
to be based on the object of making war less costly, not necessarily of
saving lives and property during wars6 The rules also reflect "deep-
seated taboos" like the taboo against fire, and "self-interest," such as
the desire to preserve a military advantage (like Britain's navy)
against a new technology (submarines). Or so holds the standard wis-
dom. But this hodgepodge is not satisfactory, and a more parsimoni-
ous explanation is needed.
III. A THEORY
A. A Simple Case Involving Equal States
Imagine two states (i = 1, 2) that start with equal resources (r!)
and then invest them either in productive capital (ei) or military capi-
tal (f).8 Productive capital produces goods for domestic consumption;
military capital produces appropriative capacity -the ability to extract
a share of the other state's resources. Each state knows that the other
state will divide its resources between production and predation; there
is full information.
The efficiency with which resources are converted into produc-
tive or military capital depends on the productive and military tech-
nologies. Keeping things simple, we will assume a simple productive
technology where one unit of production produces one unit of income.
Think of the two states jointly producing an income (y) equal to the
sum of their respective investments in productive capital (y = e, + e2).
This joint income is, in effect, a common pool from which each state
extracts a share through its investment in military capital. Each unit of
investment in military capital increases the investing state's share of
the joint income, holding constant the other state's investment. If each
state invests an equal amount, each obtains half of the joint income; if
6 See Greenwood, Law of Weaponry at 190 (cited in note 2) (describing Russia as "being
particularly concerned to ensure that limits were placed on the introduction of new weapons and
the consequent increases in military expenditure which these would entail").
7 See id at 191 (describing how weapons that violate taboos or that are new often are
treated as being particularly barbaric).
8 I rely on a simplified version of Hirshleifer's conflict model here and throughout, and
the reader should consult his discussion for assumptions, limitations, and so forth. See Jack
Hirshleifer, The Paradox of Power, in Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force: Economic
Foundations of Conflict Theory 43, 63-64 (Cambridge 2001). I do not discuss production tech-
nology and thus assume that in his model the production technology variable s = 1. For a related
model, see Herschel I. Grossman and Minseong Kim, Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Se-
curity of Claims to Property, 103 J Polit Econ 1275,1287 (1995) (discussing the relationship be-
tween security of claims to property and economic well-being, and arguing that poorer states
may benefit where claims to property are less secure).
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one state invests more than the other, then the first state's share is lar-
ger than one half. The military technology, m > 0, is a variable that
changes as a result of technological and strategic innovation. As mili-
tary technology becomes more efficient, a state that invests one addi-
tional unit in military capital will obtain a larger share of the joint in-
come, holding constant the other state's investment in military capital.'
The jointly optimal outcome occurs if both states invest all their
resources in production and none in predation. They produce the
maximum output and divide it evenly.'° The problem is that each state
has an incentive to invest in predation as well. If state j invests 0 in its
military, then state i can obtain all of the joint income by investing a
small amount in its military. Because state j has the same incentive,
both states will invest a positive amount in their militaries. Further,
because each state expects the other to engage in some predation, the
first state does not expect to obtain the full marginal dollar of its in-
vestment in productive capital; this creates an additional incentive to
move resources from production to predation. On the other hand, nei-
ther state will invest all of its resources in military capital, for then at
the margin it will obtain relatively little or nothing from the other
state while foregoing the opportunity to produce goods and keep a
share of them.
In equilibrium each state will invest equal, positive amounts in
both military and productive capital. What is more interesting, for our
purposes, is that the states will invest more in military capital as the
military technology becomes more efficient (holding constant produc-
tive efficiency). The reason is that with greater efficiency, the preda-
tory returns generated by an additional dollar invested in military
capital will be greater than the share of productive returns generated
by an additional dollar invested in productive capacity. But because
both states invest more in predation, they become jointly worse off.
Thus, the prisoner's-dilemma-like logic of the game forces the states to
impose greater joint costs on each other as military technology be-
comes more efficient.
The states will be better off if they can jointly limit (1) investment
in military capital, or (2) the efficiency of military technology. The first
goal is generally reflected in arms limitation agreements and is not of
9 A state's share p, = f- / (f7 + f,"). Thus, each state's utility function is py, subject to
re, +f.
10 For now, I assume that each state wants to maximize consumption; a common assump-
tion among realists is that states care about relative position. I will later discuss the realist posi-
tion. See text accompanying note 22.
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concern here. The second goal suggests a hypothesis for the laws of
war: They are designed to limit the efficiency of military technology.
This hypothesis sheds light both on the general standards and
specific rules. The necessity principle, by requiring states to use weap-
ons and tactics that do not cause too much harm given a military ob-
jective, forces the state to use less powerful or destructive weapons. By
reducing the options available to commanders, the principle reduces
the capacity of a unit of military investment to inflict harm on the en-
emy. The same is true for the discrimination principle, which requires a
military force to take losses rather than inflict too much harm on civil-
ians and civilian property. The discrimination principle thus increases
the cost of achieving a given objective, that is, increasing one's share of
the joint income.
Rules prohibiting poison gas, the execution of prisoners, the lay-
ing of untethered mines at sea, and many other activities exhibit a
similar logic. Poison gas can be cheap and effective; prisoners are costs
when conditions prevent their use as hostages or workers;" untethered
mines are cheaper than tethered mines; and so forth. Also consistent
with the hypothesis are recurrent (but usually unsuccessful) efforts to
restrict the use of new, highly effective weapons -the crossbow, sub-
marines, and nuclear devices.
The rules against perfidy can also be understood from this per-
spective. Perfidy-for example, displaying the white flag but then fir-
ing on enemy forces as they approach-is a highly effective tactic, in
the sense that it enables a weaker force to inflict losses on a stronger
force by luring the latter into the open. Of course, once one side uses
this tactic, the other side will not trust it, but we must assume that the
first side takes the costs into account. The rules against perfidy remove
an option that is sometimes effective, thus driving up the cost of mili-
tary operations.
The laws relating to neutrality are designed to make clear the
ways that belligerents will treat neutrals. Belligerents generally want
expansive rights-they want to be able to stop neutral ships and
search for, and seize, materials being shipped to the enemy; they also
want to blockade enemy ports. Although belligerents also fear that if
they treat neutrals too roughly these states will enter the war on the
other side, they will balance this cost against the benefit. If laws of
11 For discussions of this argument, see Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Interna-
tional Law: Comment on Conference Papers, 31 J Legal Stud S321, S325 (2002) (discussing the
costs associated with keeping prisoners of war and noting that these costs are negligible); James
D. Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 Intl Org 971,979 (2001)
(discussing the cost of maintaining treatment standards required by POW conventions).
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neutrality are constraining, then they again take an effective tactic
from the hands of the belligerent. (It is conceivable that strong neutral
rights should be counted as the effective weapon-for example, if
enemies transport spies and saboteurs via neutral vessels. But the his-
tory of the laws of war suggest otherwise: that being able to stop,
block, or sink neutral ships was an important freedom for belliger-
ents.)
The main barrier to empirical verification of the model is the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing between efficient and inefficient technology.
There is much debate, for example, about whether poison gas is effi-
cient or inefficient; apparently efficient technologies like laser-guided
bombing are in fact not efficient if they are too costly. Still, the "tech-
nology limitation" hypothesis has enough support to be considered a
legitimate rival to the ill-defined humanitarian view. It implies that
laws of war will be directed foremost at the most efficient weapons
(that is, weapons with the highest ratio of military effectiveness to
cost, and thus not necessarily the most expensive weapons). It also
implies that states would ban all weapons if they could; but we will see
why they do not go that far in the next two Parts.
B. Unequal States
Suppose now that state i starts with more resources than state j.
Some of the basic results of the original analysis continue to hold:
Each state will invest some amount in military capital and as a result
neither is as well off as it would be if both invested solely in produc-
tive capital. However, with unequal resources there is a twist.
Suppose that the military technology is below some threshold m*.
Despite its greater wealth, state i will invest the same amount in mili-
tary capital as state j, and thus more in productive capital. The reason
is that state j, given its limited resources, will not produce much in-
come; thus state i gains little from investing in predation and instead
will invest more in production. State j thus has all the more to gain
from predation-it gets a share of the income disproportionately pro-
duced by state i. State j will gain relative to state i. In the extreme case,
they could end up with the same share of the joint income. Hirshleifer
calls this phenomenon the "paradox of power": a weaker state can
gain at a stronger state's expense.
This result, however, does not hold for sufficiently high m and for
sufficiently great inequality. Above a certain m*, and with sufficient
inequality, state i will be able to invest much more in military capital
12 See Hirshleifer, The Paradox of Power at 52-59 (cited in note 8).
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than state j can. State j's resources put a ceiling on the amount it can
invest in military capital; once production is down to 0, state ] can allo-
cate no more resources to the military. But a sufficiently large state i
can devote much more to the military, and thus maintain or increase
its advantage against j. An illustration might be the American defeat
by North Vietnam and victory over Iraq. In the comparatively low-
technology Vietnam War, North Vietnam's lack of productive oppor-
tunities made its opportunity cost of military investment very low.'3 As
for Iraq, even if it had put all its resources into military investment, it
would have been unable to resist superior American technology and
training.
This analysis adds a dimension to the earlier model. There is a
long history, from the Berber pirates to the current exporters of ter-
rorism, of using international law against small predatory states. Ef-
forts to ban the use of chemical and biological weapons and the
spread of nuclear weapons reflect this logic, as does (controversially)
recent efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. A small state with powerful
weapons can extract tribute, concessions, and other benefits from a
much wealthier state, and wealthier states would like to respond, even
in concert, by creating international law that restricts the weapons and
tactics favoring the small states." The rules requiring humane treat-
ment of POWs, and permitting trickery but not torture to extract in-
formation from them, while to all appearances humane, likely benefit
wealthier states that have the resources to hold POWs in decent con-
ditions, transport them to safe locations, and conduct lengthy interro-
gations. But if we can understand why large states would create inter-
national law banning these weapons and tactics, we should not be sur-
prised that they have trouble enforcing it. Large states that suffer less
from small state extortion have little reason to aid large states that
suffer more; indeed, refusing to render such assistance will produce
relative gains in a security competition.
The model therefore suggests that small states will not necessarily
consent to the laws of war. When North Vietnam objected to a pro-
posed law against cluster bombs during the Lucerne Conference of
1974, a delegate explained that "a weapon used by the imperialist is an
imperialist weapon.... In the hands of a liberation fighter, it is a sa-
13 One must be careful about fitting the model to the facts. The joint income includes con-
trol over the economic and political decisions of North Vietnam and Iraq.
14 Also known as the "weapons of the weak." See Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights:
Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 Intl Org 613, 641 (1998) (describing such
weapons as "cheap equalizers that undermine the exclusive advantages of centralized high-
technology state violence, both within the state and among the hierarchy of states").
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cred tool.""5 Small states seek to outlaw only those weapons and tactics
that rich states alone can afford. Rich states will support bans on
cheap and effective weapons, and also on more expensive ones to the
extent that they are more concerned about their absolute level of pro-
duction than about the relative standing of poorer states. Multilateral
consensus will be difficult to achieve, and peace conferences that be-
gin with high hopes will often produce vague principles or rules with
large loopholes-a recurrent complaint about the Hague and Geneva
conventions.
C. Destructive Weapons
One can make a useful distinction between effective weapons and
destructive weapons. 6 For a given level of military investment an effec-
tive weapon increases the state's share of joint income more than a
less effective weapon. By contrast, holding constant its effectiveness, a
destructive weapon reduces the size of the joint income more than a
less destructive weapon. In the prior Parts, we assumed that military
capital had zero destructiveness: The loss of income came indirectly
through the investment in military capital rather than productive capi-
tal. With positive destructiveness, a weapon reduces the size of the
joint income independently of its effect on parties' incentives to allo-
cate resources between the two types of capital.
The destructiveness of weapons appears to be an important
theme of the laws of war. Illustrations include limitations on destruc-
tion to civilians and civilian structures, on the mistreatment of POWs,
on weapons that cause devastating wounds, on mines and other weap-
ons whose dangerousness persists after the conflict ends, and on
weapons that cause significant environmental harm. The objectionable
feature of these practices is, one might argue, not the efficiency of the
technology but the extent to which the weapons harm productive
capital, defined broadly to include the human capital of civilians and
of soldiers after they are demobilized.
One might therefore conclude that the laws of war are designed
to limit the destructiveness of war, and in doing so, to increase produc-
tion and reduce investment in military capital. But the truth is more
complex. It is possible that limits on the destructiveness of weapons
make states worse off, not better.
15 Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing 155 (Zed 1995).
16 See Grossman and Kim, 103 J Polit Econ at 1279 (cited in note 8). Hirshleifer's model
does not make this distinction, and I use a modified version of it in this Part.
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To see why, one must understand that the destructiveness of a
weapon has a good as well as a bad side. States are less likely to go to
war against states that have destructive weapons, even if all states
have the same weapons. Assume that each of two states has the same
resources. Imagine that the existing military capacity of a state can be
measured by a variable v, where a high v means that a given invest-
ment in military capacity results in a relatively large reduction in the
joint surplus available to both states. If v = 0, as in our examples prior
to this Part, then each state will invest a given amount in military
technology. For v > 0, each state will reduce its investment in military
technology. The reason is that while a given amount of military activity
will have the same distributional effects as before, it will also reduce
the size of the joint income that will be divided. With a lower marginal
benefit from military investment, states will invest fewer resources in
military capital. In equilibrium, there will continue to be some military
investment, but less, and the joint income will be higher than it would
be if v were equal to 0. If a state can win a war only by destroying the
enemy's cities and factories -and in the process loses its own cities
and factories as well -then the fruits of victory are not particularly at-
tractive, and neither is conflict.
The argument is not as paradoxical as it sounds: Many people be-
lieve that the fear of nuclear destruction prevented military conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
The deterrence value of these weapons was one reason why the Inter-
national Court of Justice did not declare them illegal." During World
War II, commanders frequently used a similar argument to justify the
destruction of cities and civilians through massive aerial bombard-
ment. The more ruthless we are today, the more likely they will sur-
render tomorrow rather than a year from now.
At the same time, one cannot deny that the general principles of
the laws of war-the proportionality principle, and so forth-are in
tension with the proposition that destructive weapons are desirable.
This proposition thus might better explain why states and interna-
tional bodies have been reluctant to prohibit particular weapons and
tactics that are clearly destructive -nuclear weapons, again, are exem-
plary-even when they are highly efficient. Restrictions on destruc-
tiveness have remained abstract, rhetorical, and ineffectual.
Let me say a few words about destructiveness when states have
unequal endowments. Recall that poor states gain more from highly
effective weapons than wealthy states do, at least up to some thresh-
17 See note 4.
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old of effectiveness. This gives wealthy states a reason for favoring
laws that limit the effectiveness of weapons. One might think that a
similar logic is at work for destructiveness, but there are many offset-
ting effects. An increasingly destructive weapon makes conflict less
likely, but as we have seen, conflict can (but does not always) favor
poorer states. On the other hand, the destruction itself is a deadweight
cost and can reduce joint income to the point where the poorer state is
made worse off. And of course much depends on the extent of the
inequality of resources. So it is hazardous to judge the impact of de-
structiveness on enthusiasm for international law when states have
unequal resources.
D. Summary
States have an interest in agreeing to binding (if possible) laws of
war that limit the effectiveness of military weapons; but the zone of
agreement shrinks as one takes account of (1) the inequality of wealth
among states, and (2) the value of destructive weapons for averting
war. In the next Part, I discuss further reasons why agreement on ro-
bust laws of war is difficult.
IV. COMPLICATIONS
A. Bargaining
In the conflict model, the technblogy, m, is exogenous, but in the
story I tell, the states set the limits of technology by agreeing to laws
of war. The conflict model is sufficient for explaining some basic intui-
tions-the indirect cost of efficient weapons-but raises the question
whether states would be able to bargain to an optimal m. Standard
bargaining models suggest that they could in principle, but that there
would also be significant barriers and complications.
Imagine that states can agree to an enforceable iW, which is less
than or equal to the exogenously given level of technology, m. Now
the states have two choice variables: M_ and f, the amount that they in-
vest in conflict. If f is observable and enforceable, and the states have
full information, they would immediately agree on f = 0 for each state,
the jointly optimal outcome. If states have private information, or if a
very low f is not enforceable, as would be the case if states have ex-
ogenous security needs, or must feed a military-industrial complex, or
cannot be credibly threatened with retaliation for a low level of in-
vestment, then they would agree on some low f, as low as possible,
probably after a delay. To the extent that f cannot be observed or en-
forced, the states have an incentive to agree on i, in effect substitut-
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ing a technological limit for direct regulation of military spending, but
only so long as the technological limit reduces the marginal benefit
from the investment in f. If, as seems likely, states can monitor both f
and m, albeit with difficulty, then it would make sense for them to try
to limit both, through arms limitation agreements and laws of war.
Note that arms limitation agreements don't usually put a ceiling on
military spending but on the amount of spending on a particular
weapon. In this respect, they limit investment in conflict by forcing
states to choose between spending less on the military, and spending
more money on less effective weapons. Laws of war differ from arms
limitation agreements by allowing any f, but by discouraging invest-
ment in fby reducing the marginal benefit of the investment.
B. Enforcement
States can enjoy increased levels of production and consumption
only if the bargain sticks. In other work, I have argued that interna-
tional law is best understood as a label for self-enforcing behavior:
Self-interested states are constrained by their expectations about the
strategies chosen by other states.8 Such an approach can be used for
the laws of war as well.' 9 Alternatively, one might believe that the laws
of war are internalized by states, and states treat these laws as con-
straints. Whatever one's view, states will bargain to technological and
spending limits only when these limits can be enforced; limits on en-
forceability probably explain why the laws of war are currently so thin
and abstract.
As I mentioned at the beginning of the Essay, states frequently
violate the laws of war. The frequency is concealed by the tendency of
historians and international lawyers to treat relatively humane behav-
ior as though it were compelled by laws, rather than the result of self-
interested military policy. Josiah Ober, for example, argues that the
ancient Greeks recognized rules against summary execution of pris-
oners, attack on noncombatants, pursuit of defeated opponents be-
yond a limited duration, and many other forms of warfare that are
condemned to the present day."' But these "rules" could be descrip-
18 See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U Chi L Rev 1113, 1120-33 (1999) (explaining customary international law through game theo-
retic analysis).
19 For a theory of compliance with the laws of war, see James D. Morrow, The Laws of War,
Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J Legal Stud S41 (2002). He
treats the laws as efforts by states to identify in advance self-enforcing strategies in a game of at-
trition.
20 See Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds,
The Laws of War 12, 13 (cited in note 1) (listing important "unwritten conventions governing in-
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tions of behavioral regularities rather than constraints on self-
interested behavior. Prisoners are not usually executed, but only be-
cause they have value as hostages and are often ransomed. Armies of-
ten spare noncombatants because they pose no immediate threat, they
can provide supplies, information, and other services, and armies do
not wish to give other civilians a reason for resistance. And any army
that pursues a defeated opponent risks outrunning its supply lines and
falling into disorder. Patterns of behavior that seem humane are not
necessarily signs of humanity. The view shared by Ober and others
mistakenly assumes that the military objective is always to slaughter
as many people as possible, when it is more often to acquire territory
and secure other resources, activities that often are best accomplished
by treating civilians and even enemy soldiers with restraint. Much the
same can be said about the other instances where the laws of war ap-
pear to have been observed: the humane treatment of (some) POWs
during World War II, the refusal by many states to use poison gas dur-
ing the same war, and so forth. In fact, however, international law was
ignored repeatedly and flagrantly by all sides during World War I and
II, and during countless smaller wars throughout the twentieth cen-
tury.
The weakness of the laws of war is not hard to understand. Al-
though one can derive a reputational theory for compliance, there is
no reason to believe that the empirical predicates of the theory are in
place. Information asymmetries and coordination problems will inter-
fere with joint efforts to punish states that violate the laws of war. It is
always hard to verify that a violation has occurred, and states will of-
ten be reluctant to expend resources punishing a violator (who may
well be an ally) or, as these game theory models often require, an in-
nocent state that refuses to punish a violator. Asymmetries in power
and resources, as explained below, cause further difficulties.
Neither reputational concerns nor interior controls, then, have
much influence on the conduct of states during war, but they might
have some influence. If they do, then the laws of war can be under-
stood according to the theory of this Essay. If they do not-if the laws
of war are public relations only-then speculation about their nature
and purpose is idle.
C. Technological and Other Strategic Asymmetries
A significant barrier to agreement on the laws of war, even if they
are enforceable, is the asymmetry of the positions of states. We have
terstate conflict" in classical Greek times).
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already discussed asymmetry of resources; another asymmetry is tech-
nological. Russia proposed the Hague Peace Conferences in the hope
of restricting a powerful type of field gun recently developed by Aus-
tria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary naturally opposed Russia's design and
no such law was created. Yet another asymmetry is strategic. Britain
sought restrictions on submarines because it feared that they would
threaten Britain's dominant navy. States with weaker navies opposed
Britain's position." Opponents of the recent treaty that bans mines
point out that many signatories have no need for mines; for other
states, mines keep the peace between them and belligerent neighbors.
When a facially neutral law of war has distributional effects because
of the asymmetric positions of states, agreement will be difficult unless
there are side payments or compromises. But because of the great
heterogeneity among states-and particularly in their technological
capacities and their strategic positions-it will be very rare for all
states to benefit from a significant limitation on weapons or tactics;
vanishingly rare if states care about their relative position. Asymmetry
of position is probably the most important factor limiting the laws of
war, forcing peace conference delegates to produce vague standards
rather than crisp rules.
D. Multi-State Agreements and Wars
Wars often involve more than two powers. An increase in the
number of states is likely to result in an increase in the amount of
military investment, and a decrease in the amount of productive in-
vestment. The logic is the same as that for the Cournot model of oli-
gopoly: As the number of firms increases, cooperation becomes more
difficult, and the cooperative surplus declines. The laws of war should
be either weaker and more limited, or broken more frequently, as the
number of states increases.
21 See Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World
War 1 37 (Cornell 1995) (describing France's recalcitrance toward restrictions on submarine use
in light of Britain's naval superiority). France during the Napoleonic Wars also attempted to use
international law to constrain Britain's dominance at sea. See John B. Hattendorf, Maritime Con-
flict, in Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds, The Laws of War 98, 107-08 (cited in note 1)
(describing the positions of various states concerning maritime laws in the Napoleonic period).
There have been similar conflicts between nations that depend on maritime commerce, and their
opponents. See Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea 23-53 (Kluwer 1992) (describing the posi-
tions of various world powers during negotiations of the 1907 Hague Convention on Mine War-
fare at Sea).
22 International criminal courts and international war crimes legislation also fit within the
analysis: The ICC can be understood as an effort to increase the United States's cost of project-
ing military power. See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U
Chi L Rev 89, 100-01 (2003).
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The modern laws of war emerged from multilateral conferences
and have many signatories. James Morrow argues that laws of war
arise when many states agree in advance of war, rather than when a
few belligerents agree at the start of a war, because in the prewar pe-
riod a veil of ignorance facilitates agreement by masking the distribu-
tional effects of the laws.3 The problem with this view is that the multi-
lateral treaty must be self-enforcing; if earlier agreement is disadvan-
tageous to one state at the start of the war, the state will not obey the
treaty. In addition, states do send each other messages during wars, in
which they abjure first use of a weapon like poison gas but threaten to
retaliate in case of use by the enemy. The simplest explanation for
multilateral treaties is that every state, or nearly every state, faces
some of the same basic strategic interactions in any war, and so there
are gains from multilateral negotiations rather than numerous bilat-
eral negotiations. But one conjectures that these treaties have more
influence on subsequent two-state wars than on multistate free-for-
alls, where strategies of reciprocation are less likely to succeed.
E. Offense and Defense
There is a difference between offensive technology and defensive
technology. It is said that the machine gun was a decisive defensive
weapon at one time, and the tank was a decisive offensive weapon.
One might conjecture that the laws of war would be designed to dis-
courage offensive technology and encourage defensive technology.
The problem with this argument, however, is that offensive and
defensive technologies should have similar effects on the depletion ofjoint income. A high technology offensive weapon encourages each
state to invest more in conflict: One dollar on offense now yields a
higher share, if the other side's strategy remains constant. But the
same argument applies to defensive technology. With highly effective
defensive technology, each state will invest more in defense, thus di-
verting resources from productive uses. The logic is symmetrical. '
F. Ineffective Weapons
It is sometimes suggested that laws of war prevent states from us-
ing ineffective weapons, rather than effective weapons.' The laws
23 See Morrow, 31 J Legal Stud at $54-$55 (cited in note 19).
24 Grossman and Kim's model distinguishes offense and defense, and what for Hirshleifer
is the "conflict technology" is for Grossman and Kim the advantage of offense over defense.
25 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars at 129-30 (cited in note 4) (attributing this view to
Henry Sidgwick). This is also an implicit theme in Best, Humanity in Warfare at 280-85 (cited in
note 1), where he argues that area bombing during World War II was illegal because it was both
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against use of poison gas might have succeeded because poison gas
was an ineffective weapon. Humane treatment of POWs might be a
useful strategy for encouraging surrender. These arguments might be
true, but it is hard to understand why states would bother to outlaw
practices that have no military value. A state would unilaterally re-
frain from those practices and hope that the enemy is foolish enough
to engage in them. There is no law against the bow and arrow; why
should there be a law against poison gas that blows back onto friendly
troops? It might be the case that these weapons have a very small
military value, and so states comply with international law in order to
enhance their reputations for being good international citizens; but if
the cost of refraining from use is so small, the reputational gain should
be minimal. It might also be the case that war is a primal cultural ex-
pression rather than an instrument of policy,26 and perhaps states in
interwar periods hope to prevent a predictable descent into barbarism
during times of war. But international law would not be much use
against those seeking a Gotterdimmerung. The better interpretation is
that states ban weapons and tactics that states believe, or fear, will be
highly effective, and indeed that was the attitude motivating regula-
tion of poison gas prior to World War 11.27
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 collectively pro-
duced twenty-three conventions, declarations, and final acts. Forty-six
states signed, ratified, or adhered to some or all of the seven 1899
documents by 1907. Forty-five states signed, ratified, or adhered to
some or all of the sixteen 1907 documents by 1914. I analyzed these
data statistically, focusing on the 1907 documents because there was
greater variation in the states' responses.
For the dependent variable, I use the number of documents that a
state signed, ratified, or adhered to, minus the number of reserva-
tions." This is a rough measure of a state's enthusiasm for laws of war,
as incorporated in the 1907 documents. For the 1907 conference, the
dependent variable could range from 0 to 13;9 in fact, the range was
inhumane and less effective than precision bombing.
26 See John Keegan, A History of Warfare 3 (Knopf 1993) ("[W]ar antedates the state, di-
plomacy and strategy by many millennia. Warfare ... reaches into the most secret places of the
human heart, places ... where emotion is paramount, where instinct is king.").
27 See Legro, Cooperation Under Fire at 158-59 (cited in note 21).
28 The source of the data is The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Reports
to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 175-77,898-901 (Oxford 1917) (James Brown Scott,
ed).
29 I excluded the first three conventions (for the pacific settlement of international dis-
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from 4 to 13. One might argue that it is inappropriate to subtract res-
ervations because they reflect the seriousness with which the state
takes its responsibilities under international law; and, indeed, democ-
racies use reservations in human rights treaties more often than dicta-
torships. But there is not a statistically significant relationship between
the democratic status of a state and its use of reservations to the 1907
laws of war.
The most concrete result of the conflict model is a prediction that
states will support laws of war that limit effectiveness but not laws
that limit destructiveness. But although the distinction is conceptually
clear-a neutron bomb is less destructive than conventional explo-
sives of equal magnitude, but just as effective -I have not found data
that reflect this distinction. So instead I focus on some subsidiary, and
more ambiguous, hypotheses.
First, I hypothesize that militarily weaker states will more
strongly support the laws of war when they involve expensive new
technologies, as was the case with the Hague Conference, which can
be traced to the emergence of frightening and expensive new weapons
from the industrial revolution.
Second, states that have recently been in wars will more strongly
support laws of war, because they will have better information about
the effectiveness of weapons.
Third, economically powerful states will more strongly support
the laws of war because they gain more from production than from
military predation.
Fourth, democracies seem more likely to support laws of war
than non-democracies, either because of the public relations value of
international law (an old realist chestnut) or because democracies
place greater value on the rule of law than non-democracies do.
Variable definitions and sources, and summary statistics are in the
appendix, and the results are in Table 1.
putes, the limitation of the use of force for the recovery of contract debts, and the opening of
hostilities) because they are not traditionally included among the laws of war. If these conven-
tions are included, the results for the population variable remain robust, and the democracy vari-
able is no longer significant. See the regression results in the working version of this Essay,
online at http://ssm.con/id=332620 (visited Nov 8, 2002).
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TABLE 1
democracy 0.19 (2.02)
military expenditure (millions of nominal British pounds) -0.03 (-1.82)
war in last 30 years -0.82 (-0.13)
population (logged) -0.43 (-2.08)
obs 40
adj r2  0.276
Note: dependent variable is number of 1907 conventions, declarations, etc., to which state
agreed, minus reservations; t-statistic in parentheses; in bold if statistically significant at the
0.1 level or below.
The military variable is consistent with the weak state hypothesis;
the war variable provides no support for the learning hypothesis; and
the population variable contradicts the economic power hypothesis,
though it is not clear whether population is a good indication of eco-
nomic power (GDP and similar measures were not available). Perhaps
more populous states, even those that have not invested much in the
military, feel relatively secure, and are thus reluctant to bind them-
selves to international law. Democracies are more enthusiastic about
the 1907 Hague conventions than non-democracies.
I do not want to make much of either the negative or positive re-
sults. One can think of lots of reasons for not trusting the data (includ-
ing the low number of observations, the unreliability of historical data,
and the high degree of multicollinearity). But further research would
be illuminating, and a natural place to start would be the Geneva
Conventions, and in particular the length of time before a state rati-
fied them, and the number of reservations.
CONCLUSION
One cannot say with confidence that the laws of war constrain
the behavior of states, but one can say that states see an advantage in
entering treaties and conventions regarding the laws of war. This
might be public relations, as is sometimes argued, but it is just as likely
that states perceive a more concrete benefit if mutual compliance
turns out to be possible. The benefit, should mutual compliance occur,
is greater production and consumption for civilians than would occur
if military investment were unconstrained. In this way, the laws of war
(jus in bello) are consistent with other laws and agreements about war.
Laws of war, arms control agreements, and limitations on the condi-
tions under which war can be started (jus ad bellum), work together to
reduce the total amount of resources devoted to predatory activities.
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This argument should not necessarily be considered a rejection of
the humanitarian view. Reducing conflict so that states can invest in
production is broadly consistent with humanitarian aims. The problem
with existing statements of the humanitarian view is that they are not
clear and not parsimonious, and the theory presented in this Essay can
be seen as a first effort to fill this gap in the literature.
APPENDIX'
A. Two Equal States
There are two states (i = 1, 2) with equal resources, r (r = r1 = r2).Each divides ri among productive effort, ei, and fighting effort,f. Thus:
r = e, + f .They produce joint income of y, and we will assume y = e, +
e2. Each state's share of the income (p,) is a function of the amount in-
vested in effort: p, = f (/, + f), where j # i, and m is the conflict
technology. Thus, each state obtains income of y, = py.
Each state maximizes its share of the income given the other
state's strategy of maximizing its own share. The reaction curves (ex-
cept for corner solutions) are:
fi If,' = m(el + e2) I/ M + f2 m )
It follows that:f1 =f 2 = me, = me2 = r - me,. It is clear that as m in-
creases, the share of income devoted to fighting increases, the share
devoted to productive effort declines, and income declines.
Let ri = 100. (Thus joint resources are 200). If m = 1, then each
state devotes 50 to fighting and 50 to production. Income is thus 100,
and each state ends up with 50. Conflict dissipates 100.
Now let m = 2. Then each state devotes twice as much to fighting
as to production. Given initial resources of 100, each state devotes 67
to fighting and 33 to production. Income is thus 66, and each state
ends up with 33. Conflict dissipates 134.
The states would be jointly better off if they could agree to limit
m (or f). Technically, limiting m means preventing either side from im-
proving weapons and tactics in such a way that would increase its
share of the income if the other side did not also improve weapons
and tactics.
30 Parts A and B are based on simplified versions of the model in Hirshleifer, The Paradox
of Power at 55 (cited in note 8); Part C contains a modified version of that model.
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B. Two Unequal States
Now let r, > r, Hirshleifer shows that under certain conditions,
the poorer state can obtain a (relative) advantage from conflict with a
richer state. Formally, y, / y2 < r, / r, Here is his numerical example:
Let (r1, r2) = (200, 100), and m = 1. From the reaction curves,
(ff 2) = (75,75), (e1, e2) = (125,25), and (y, Y2 ) = 75, 75. Thus, the states
go from a relationship of inequality to a relationship of equality."
However, at a sufficiently high m the original relationship of ine-
quality will be sustained or made more extreme. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case where m = 3. If there were an interior solution, state 2
would need to invest more than 100 in f2; with the resource ceiling
state 2 will invest 100 only. State l's best response is to choose f, = 113.
Thus: (el, e2) = (89, 0), and (y1, y2) = (49, 40). Here, the rich state retains
a relative advantage, although not as high as when it began. But as m
increases, the rich state will obtain an increasingly large portion of the
initial income, and eventually will improve its relative position. Thus, if
military technology is relatively low, and resources are not too un-
equal, rich states will seek to limit military technology, and poor states
will not; if military technology is relatively high, and resources are suf-
ficiently unequal, poor states will seek to limit military technology, and
rich states will not.
C. Destructiveness
We can add a variable v, for destructiveness, and alter
Hirshleifer's model in the following way. For state 1 (and similarly for
state 2), let:
_ A _ 1 f 2 e l+ e 2
Y' f +/f(fA + f)v
The destructiveness variable, v > 1. If v = 1, then the model is the
same as Hirshleifer's (with m = 1), which assumes no destructiveness.
For a higher v, the surplus declines in proportion to the amount in-
vested in military capital.
Using constrained optimization, the reaction curve for state 1
(and similarly for state 2) is:
vfl el +e 2
fA-v(f-f 2 ) f + f 2
31 Hirshleifer, The Paradox of Power at 53 (cited in note 8).
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One can see that when v = 1, Hirshleifer's reaction curves are ob-
tained. It is also clear that total productive investment (that is, joint
income) is increasing in v, that is, with destructiveness. For the equal
resources case, ei = fv r
D. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dependent 45 10.6 2.1 4 13
democracy (0-10) 44 3.1 3.1 0 10
population (1000s) 45 23753 66296 240 425577
military expendi-
tures (1000s of £'s) 43 8952 21037 35 119587
war since 1870
(yes=l) 47 0.4 0.5 0 1
Variable definitions:3'
Enthusiasm (dependent). The number of conventions, declara-
tions, acts, and protocols which a state signed or ratified, or to which it
adhered, minus the number of reservations, at the Hague Conference
of 1907. The first three conventions were excluded because they are
not technically a part of jus in bello, the subject of the analysis. No dis-
tinction was made between earlier or later expressions of consent that
occurred by 1914; and only states that had consented by 1914 were in-
cluded in the study.
Democracy. A scale from 0 (undemocratic) to 10 (highly democ-
ratic) developed by political scientists; the scale focuses on the degree
of political competition. For a discussion, see the website address in
the footnote.
Population. The number of citizens in 1900 or the closest year for
which there are data up to 1910.
Military expenditures. The amount of money (in thousands of
British pounds) spent on the military, in 1900 or the closest year for
which there are data up to 1910.
War since 1870. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state was in a
war since 1870, and 0 otherwise.
32 Democracy variable from the Polity II dataset, online at ftp://isere.colorado.edu/
pub/datasets/p4/p4vksg.asc (visited Nov 12,2002). Wars since 1870 are from Melvin Small and J.
David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980 82-99 (Sage 1982). All
other data are from the Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan, online at
http://www.umich.edu/-cowproj/dataset.html (visited Nov 12, 2002). The baseline was 1900,
though not all data were available for that date; if not, data within ten years were used.
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